


| THE 
RAILROAD QUESTION 


ADDRESS BY 


S. M. FELTON 


PRESIDENT, CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILROAD 


CHAIRMAN, WESTERN RAILWAYS COMMITTEE 
ON PUBLIC RELATIONS 


BEFORE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
FORT DODGE, IOWA 


MAY 4TH, 1923. 





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THE RAILROAD QUESTION 


AN ADDRESS BY 


S. M. FELTON 


PRESIDENT, CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILROAD 
CHAIRMAN, WESTERN RAILWAYS COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS 
\ 


BEFORE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
FORT DODGE, IOWA 


May 4th, 1923. 


The railroads and the people of the United States are this 
year confronted with two important and even serious crises 
in transportation affairs. One is due to the existing shortage 
of transportation. The other is due to the state of public 
opinion regarding railway affairs, especially in Iowa and other 
western states. 

I intend to discuss these crises together today, because 
they are closely related. The shortgage of transportation with 
which the country is now immediately confronted is a menace 
to our prosperity. The state of public sentiment regarding 
railway matters in some parts of the country is a still greater 
menace, because, unless it is changed it will cause a shortage of 
transportation in future which will far exceed the present one 
and will bring a disaster from the effects of which the nation 
will not recover for many years. 

Everybody knows that we have now and have had for seven 
and one-half months what is called a ‘“‘car shortage.’’ This 
so-called ‘‘shortage of cars’’ began on September 1, 1922, and 
reached its climax on October 31, when it mounted to almost 
180,000 cars. It has since been reduced to about 75,000 cars. 

What these figures mean is, that for over seven months the 
railways never have been able to handle all the freight that 
has been offered to them for movement. This has been true 
in spite of the fact that throughout this period they have 


actually transported more freight than in any previous corres- 


ponding period. 

Freight business is still being offered in unprecedented 
volume and all conditions indicate that throughout this year 
the railways will be called upon to handle more business than 
ever before. The situation presents a national emergency, 
and unless emergency measures were adopted and carried out 


3 


—p 60050 


through close co-operation between the railways and shippers, 
the result would be a great increase in the car shortage and the 
infliction of enormous losses upon all the business interests and 
people of the country. 

It needs to be emphasized that this so-called ‘“‘car shortage” 
is really a shortage of all facilities of railroad transportation. 
It is due, not only to the fact that the railways have not enough 
cars, but also to the fact that they have not enough locomotives 
or adequate tracks or terminals. The country has suffered 
temporarily in past years from shortages of transportation, 
but never was it confronted with a transportation situation 
such as the present one. 

To what is this due? Its direct cause is, that some years 
ago there began, and continued for a long time, a great decline 
in the expansion of the railroads. I shall give you just a few 
figures to illustrate what has occurred. In the eight years 
ending with 1914 the number of freight cars in the country 
increased by 541,000. On the other hand, in the eight years 
ending with 1921, the number of freight cars in the country 
increased only 41,000. In the first period I: mentioned, the 
number of locomotives in the country increased over 14,300, 
while in the second period I mentioned, the number of loco- 
motives increased only 1,900. The total mileage of railroads 
in this country increased every year from 1830 to 1916. There 
began in 1916, an actual decline in railway mileage. In every 
year since then more mileage has been torn up than built; and 
at the end of 1921 there were 2,200 miles less of railway than 
in 1915. 

The production and commerce of the country have ex- 
panded within recent years at a normal rate. This is shown 
by the fact that as soon as the nation emerged from the recent 
business depression the freight offered to the railways exceeded 
all previous records. While production and commerce have 
been, within recent years, expanding at a normal rate, the 
expansion of the railroads has been abnormally small. This is 
the only true explanation of the present shortage of trans- 
portation. Why did the expansion of the railroads begin about 
ten years ago to be abnormally small? Prior to that time, 
their expansion kept pace with that of other industries. The 
great decline in the expansion of the railroads has been due to 
the fact that they have been subjected to influences to which: 


4 


other industries have not been subjected. Unfair and restric- 
tive regulation caused a decline in their expansion before the 
war. During the war the government seized them and greatly 
increased their operating expenses without making corres- 
ponding increases in their rates and earnings. Enormous def- 
icits were incurred, and they were returned to private opera- 
tion with the credit of many of them practically destroyed and 
their securities selling in the open market at the lowest prices 
in history. Their return to private operation was quickly fol- 
lowed by a business depression as a result vf which during the 
last three years their average net return has been only about 
344% on the valuation made by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. These are the reasons why the expansion of the 
railroads has declined. No business can expand without new 
capital being invested in it. The expansion of the railroads 
declined because they could not raise enough new capital to 
provide needed equipment and other facilities. 

The railways were returned to private operation under the 
Transportation Act. The provisions of this law tacitly recog- 
nized the fact that they had been unfairly and unwisely regu- 
lated, and were intended to cause rates to be made on which 
they would earn a reasonable net return—a return which 
would rehabilitate their credit and enable them to begin again 
normally increasing their facilities. The two years of acute 
depression which speedily followed made it impossible for them 
to earn the return and to make the increase in their facilities 
that the Transportation Act contemplated. The consequence 
is, as I have said, that the country today is confronted with 
the greatest shortage of means of transportation in its history. 

Railway managers are determined, however, to do every- 
thing in their power to alleviate this situation until it can be 
actually remedied. As I have already said, the roads within 
the last seven months have broken all records in handling 
freight. Realizing that more heroic measures must be adopted 
to effect the very greatest practicable increase in the service 
rendered, the managers of the railways met in New York two 
weeks ago and adopted new plans for dealing with the emer- 
gency. They agreed to spare no effort to reduce the number of 
locomotives and cars in bad order, to co-operate with each 
other in every available way and, also, to increase the service 
rendered with each locomotive and each car, and to appeal to 


5 


the shippers and consignees in every part of the country to 
give their aid by loading cars to their capacity and by loading 
and unloading them as quickly as possible. 

The problem presented by the existing transportation 
situation could not, however, be solved merely by making more 
intensive use of existing facilities. An increase of facilities is 
required. Therefore, the railway companies have authorized 
the expenditure this year of 515 million dollars for cars, 160 
million dollars for locomotives and 425 million dollars for 
trackage and other facilities, a total of one billion one hundred 
million dollars. From January 1, 1922, to March 15, 1923, 
they purchased almost 224,000 freight cars and 4,219 new 
locomotives. Of these, over 117,000 freight cars and over 2,100 
locomotives have already been received and placed in service. 

The expenditures authorized far exceed the amounts war- 
ranted by the net return the railways have earned within the 
last two years or are earning now. Such large expenditures 
have been authorized for two reasons. First, the industry 
and commerce of the country imperatively need an increased 
transportation service which cannot possibly be rendered 
without an increase in railway facilities. Secondly, the rail- 
way companies are relying upon the government and public to 
carry out in the spirit in which they were enacted the con- 
structive provisions of the Transportation Act, which direct 
the Interstate Commerce Commission to so regulate rates as 
to enable the railways to earn a fair return in order that they 
may provide the country with sufficient transportation. 

Now, it should be obvious to every intelligent and reason- 
able person that the government and public ought to encourage 
the railways, not only to carry out their present program of 
expansion, but to make and carry out an even larger program 
in future years. The program which has been adopted, while 
larger than the earnings of the railways now justify, will not 
be sufficient to enable them to handle satisfactorily even the 
present year’s business; and unless an even larger program 
is carried out in future years, the shortage of transportation 
not only will not be remedied, but will grow greater and more 
serious. | 

Unfortunately, it is by no means certain that the govern- 
ment and public will let the railways carry out even their 
present program of expansion, much less a larger program in 


6 


future. This brings me to a consideration of the second, and 
more serious crisis in transportation affairs with which the 
country is confronted. 

When the Esch-Cummins Transportation Act was being 
framed two things were made plain to the members of Con- 
gress. First, the country had just had two years of experience 
with government operation, and it was made plain that the 
public was absolutely opposed to government ownership and 
desired the railways to be returned at once to private opera- 
tion. Secondly, it was made plain that the policy of regula- 
‘tion which had been followed before the war had been unfair 
and unwise and caused a serious decline in the development of 
the railways. Therefore, Congress adopted provisions which 
were intended to cause the railways, after they were returned 
to private operation, to be so regulated as to cause a revival of 
railroad expansion. 

The principal provisions having this purpose were put into 
the famous Section 15-A. They have been called ‘‘gaurantee”’ 
provisions and it has been repeatedly charged that they ‘‘guar- 
antee’’ the railways a fixed net return. No charge more base- 
less ever was made. They do not “‘guarantee”’ the railways a 
return of 51% per cent, or 6 per cent or any other amount. 
They directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to take 
514 to 6 per cent as the measure of a fair return, but only 
until March 1, 1922. Since that date all they have required 
the Commission to do is, first, determine whether the railways 
are honestly, efficiently and economically operated; secondly, 
in determining what return they should be allowed to earn, to 
take into consideration the country’s need for adequate trans- 
portation service; and, thirdly, to determine from time to 
time what in the Commission’s opinion is a “fair return’? upon 
the valuation of the railways and so fix the rates as to enable 
the railways on the average to earn that return. In addition, 
the Commission was required, upon the basis of all the infor- 
mation in its possession, to make a tentative valuation of the 
railways, and in regulating their rates to use this tentative 
valuation as a basis until its final valuation shall be completed. 
All that these provisions attempt to guarantee to the railroads 
is fair treatment and the opportunity to provide the country 
with the transportation service that it requires. 

The Commission had in its possession all the information 


7 


regarding the railways that it had gathered in a period of 


seven years in accordance with the provisions of a law requir- 
ing it to make a valuation of all the railways which was passed 
in 1913 and the author of which was Senator La Follette of 
Wisconsin. Upon the basis of the information that it had 
gathered under the La Follette law, it placed upon the railways 
a valuation of $18,900,000,000, which, because of new invest- 
ment since made, has been increased to about $19,400,000,00. 
The Commission first fixed rates which it expected would 
yield an average return of 6 per cent, and subsequently held 
that a return of 5384 per cent would be fair. In only a single 
month, however, since the railways were returned to private 
operation, have they earned a net return of as much as 5% 
per cent; and, as I have already said, the average earned by 
them has been only about 3% per cent. 

The public sentiment which existed at the time the Trans- 
portation Act was passed is probably best illustrated by the 
vote by which it was passed. It was carried in the House of 


Representatives by 250 to 150 and in the Senate by 47 to 17. 


Practically the only influential class of people that actively 
opposed it were the railway labor organizations which were 
advocating the Plumb plan of government ownership and 
employes’ management. 

Strange as it may seem, in view of its actual provisions and 
the circumstances under which it was passed, the Transporta- 
tion Act and private management of the railways under it 
have been the objects of the most bitter attacks and the most 
widespread misrepresentation to which any law and any 
industry ever were subjected in the history of the United States. 
Before the railways were returned to private operation, they 
were incurring under government control, a deficit at the rate 
of one billion dollars a year because rates had not been ad- 
vanced anywhere near as much as their expenses had been 
increased. A few months afterward, the Railroad Labor 
Board granted an advance in wages exceeding 700 million dol- 
lars a year. It was perfectly obvious to everybody at that 
time that under these conditions railway rates must be ad- 
vanced. The average wholesale price of all commodities at 
that time was 126 per cent higher than before the war. The 
Interstate Commerce Commission granted an advance in rates 
which made passenger rates only 50 per cent higher and freight 


8 


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rates only about 75 per cent higher than before the war. No 
reasonable man could criticise the advances in rates made at 
that time. They were much less than the increases in com- 
modity prices and the increases in railway wages and other 
expenses that had occurred. 

Unfortunately, however, just when the advance in rates 
was made in 1920, there began an unprecedented decline of 
prices. For fifteen years previously, railway rates had been 
relatively lower, and during most of the time yery much 
lower than prices. Suddenly, for a very short time, railway 
rates became relatively higher than prices. Immediately there 
began throughout the country a tremendous outcry against 
alleged excessive freight rates and demands for large reductions 
in them, regardless of the fact that railway expenses could not 
immediately be reduced and that, in consequence, heavy reduc- 
tions of rates would certainly have thrown a large majority of 
the railways of the country into bankruptcy and probably 
would have caused the worst panic that this country ever had. 

Recently another change in the relationship between rail- 
way rates and prices has occurred. Prices have advanced, and 
now average 57 per cent higher than ten years ago. Railway 
rates have been reduced, and the average freight rate is now 
only 54 per cent higher than ten years ago. The prices of some 
agricultural products are not as high now compared with the 
freight rates on them as before the war. This is true, un- 
fortunately, of the prices of grains. It is not, however, true 
of all agricultural products. At the present time the price of 
wool is 136 per cent higher than ten years ago. The price of 
cotton is 115 per cent higher and of tobacco 108 per cent 
higher. Lambs are 82 per cent higher. Although, however, the 
prices of most commodities are now relatively higher as com- 
pared with freight rates than they were ten years ago, and 
although there is a great shortage of transportation which 
cannot possibly be remedied except by allowing the railways 
to earn larger net returns than they have been for a long time, 
there is still much agitation, especially in the agricultural 
districts of the west, for extensive reductions in rates. Worse 
still, there is being carried on propaganda for railway legislation, 
the adoption of which would be absolutely ruinous directly to 
most of the railways and indirectly to most of the business and 
agricultural interests of the country. 


9 


As I have already said, the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion, as a result of investigations extending over a period of 
almost ten years, has placed upon the railways a valuation of 
about 19 billion dollars. It has been charged by leaders of 
organized labor, who are seeking the adoption of the Plumb 
plan, and by certain radical public men, that this valuation is 
excessive. Senator Brookhart of Iowa has introduced a bill 
in Congress to make a new valuation based upon the market 
prices for which railway securities sell in Wall Street. Due 
to the past policies of government regulation and government 
operation the prices of railway securities are now much lower 
than in past years. Senator Brookhart claims the adoption of 
his bill would reduce the valuation to 12 billion dollars. This 
and other similar measures will be pressed for consideration in 
Congress when it meets again and will be supported by numer- 
ous radical labor leaders and public men. 

Now, I ask you to consider this proposition from three or 
four different points of view. First, I call your attention to 
the fact that the valuation made by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission is the only valuation of all the railways that has 
ever been made after thorough investigation by any official 
body. Therefore, Senator Brookhart’s proposal, by mere legis- 
lative action, to wipe out more than one-third of this valua- 
tion, is, in fact, a proposal for the bald confiscation of more 
than one-third of ‘all the property owned by the railway bond- 
holders and stockholders of this country. He contends that 
this should be done because the valuation of the railways 
exceeds the market prices of their securities. Every intelligent 
man knows, however, that during the last three years the prices 
of railway securities have been the lowest they ever have 
been, and that the great decline in their prices has been due 
almost entirely to the fact that the percentage of net return 
earned by them in these years has been the lowest it ever has 
been in 30 years. 

In a recent speech Senator Brookhart defended this proposi- 
tion upon the ground that the recent deflation of prices, for 
which he charged the responsibility to the Federal Reserve 
Board, a government body, had caused a reduction of 18 
billion dollars in the value of the farms and farm property 
of this country. 

If there is any justification for contending that the valua- 


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tion of the railways and their rates should be based in future 
upon the greatly reduced prices of their securities, then there is 
exactly equal justification for advocating legislation which will 
permanently base the value of farms and farm property, and the 
prices the farmers can charge for their products, on the reduced 
value of farms and farm property. The two cases, according 
to his own argument, are exactly analogous. Will the farmers 
of this country support a proposal that, because the value of 
their farms has declined, legislation shall be passed to con- 
fiscate permanently all that part of the value of their farms 
which has thus been temporarily lost? If not, how can they 
fairly support Senator Brookhart’s proposal to apply this 
policy to the railroads? 

The second point to which I wish to direct your attention, 
is, how much the adoption of this policy actually would save 
the publicin railway rates. Inthe year 1922 the railways spent 
85 cents out of every dollar they earned for operating expenses 
and taxes. Obviously, therefore, no substantial reduction of 
rates can ever be secured except through reductions of operating 
expenses and taxes. On the basis of present operating expenses 
and taxes, the railways would have to have total earnings of 
at least six billion dollars a year in order to receive a net return 
of 534 per cent on their total valuation. A saving of 400 
million dollars a year in net return—the amount that would be 
saved by reducing the valuation by seven billion dollars, as 
Senator Brookhart proposes—would make possible a saving in 
freight and passenger rates of only about 7 per cent. 

This arbitrary reduction in the valuation of the railways 
is advocated chiefly by radical politicians representing agri- 
cultural states, and principally as a means of reducing freight 
rates on farm products. According to the most careful and 
accurate statistics that can be made, the total freight rates 
paid annually on farm products amount to about $600,000,000. 
It cannot be assumed that the reduction in the rates secured by 
the farmers by this means would be relatively any larger than 
that secured by the shippers. Now, a reduction of 7 per cent 
in the rates paid on farm products would amount to only 
$42,000,000 a year, or to about $7.00 for each of the farmers 
of the country. 

There are many other things besides transportation con- 
ditions and railway rates that are affecting the welfare of the 


11 


farmers, and it is little less than astounding that in view of this 
fact there should be so much agitation regarding these railway 
matters. The total indebtedness of the farmers of the country 
is estimated at almost $12,500,000,000. A reduction of one- 
half of one per cent in the rate of interest on this indebtedness 
would amount to $62,500,000 a year, and a reduction of one 
per cent in the rate of interest on it would amount to $123,000,- 
000, or almost three times as much as the maximum saving in 
the freight rates of the farmers that could possibly be accom- 
plished by the radical legislation proposed by Mr. Brookhart. 
Stating the matter in another way, a reduction of one per cent 
in the rate of interest paid by the farmers on their indebtedness 
would save them more than a reduction of 20 per cent in freight 
rates on all their products. It has been estimated by’ the 
American Farm Bureau Federation that the farmers spend 
$7,000,000,000 a year for machinery, clothing, and other 
supplies and merchandise. An average reduction of two per 
cent in the prices they pay for these things would almost be 
equal to a 25 per cent reduction in the freight rates on all their 
products. Why, then, are the attacks of those who pretend 
to speak for the farmers so largely concentrated upon railway 
freight rates? 

Third, let us consider what would be the effect of the 
adoption of the legislation proposed by Mr. Brookhart upon 
the railroads? 

The effect of the proposed reduction in the valuation of the 
railways would be to cause the entire saving of rates to come 
out of the net return received by the railroads. Now, while 
the saving in rates secured by the public would be only 7 per 
cent, the reduction in the net return the railways would be 
entitled to earn would be 37 per cent. Under Senator Brook- 
hart’s plan the railways as a whole would earn the equivalent — 
of only 3384 per cent on the valuation placed on them by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Hardly any of the railroads 
would be able to pay any dividends whatever. Most of them 
would be unable to pay the interest on their bonds and would 
immediately become bankrupt. It would become impossible 
for the railways to sell new securities because many would not 
be able to pay a return even on the bonds they already have 
outstanding. The increase in the number of cars and loco- 
motives, the construction of additional tracks and terminals, 


12 


and other additions to the facilities required to enable them to 
handle increased business, would absolutely stop. Without 
an increase of means of transportation, increase in the pro- 
duction of the mines, the factories and the farms would have 
to stop, because without increased transportation a larger 
production would become impossible. The progress of the 
country would be arrested and its prosperity destroyed. 

Now, why, I ask you, do Senator Brookhart and other 
radicals make their entire attack upon the net return of the 
railroads? Why do they advocate a policy which, while it 
would reduce the net return allowed the railways by 37 per cent, 
would save the public only 7 per cent in rates? Why do they 
not join in helping the railways to reduce their operating 
expenses and taxes, which are taking 85 cents out of every 
dollar they earn, and a reduction of which, therefore, is the 
only feasible means of securing a really large reduction of rates? 
Why, instead of co-operating with the managers of the railways 
in efforts to reduce operating expenses and taxes, do they 
advocate the adoption of legislation which would financially 
destroy the railways of the country and render it absolutely 
impossible for them to furnish the public enough transportation? 

There is, in my opinion, only one answer to this question. 
This is, that those who are advocating this policy are trying to 
secure regulation which will make continuance of private owner- 
ship and management of the railways impossible, and which 
will therefore force the nation to adopt government ownership, 
whether it really wants it or not. Is it not a significant fact 
that practically every man who is advocating this kind of policy 
of regulation has been, or is now, a defender of the results of 
our war-time experiment with government operation and an 
advocate of government ownership? 

The length to which some of these men will go in trying 
to defend government operation and discredit private operation 
is strikingly illustrated by certain statements that Senator 
Brookhart made in a speech at Des Moines on March 14. In 
that speech he asserted twice that the operating expenses of 
the railways under private operation in 1921 and 1922 were 
$1,200,000,000 a year more than they were under government 
operation in 1919. This statement misrepresented the facts 
to the extent of over one billion dollars a year. According to 
the statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the 


13 


operating expenses of the railways in 1919 were $4,399,715,515, 
while in 1921 they were $4,603,806,907, and in 1922, $4,455,- 
650,216. Therefore, according to the statistics of the Commis- 
sion, the operating expenses in 1921 were only 204 million 
dollars more than in 1919 and in 1922 they were less than 56 
million dollars more than in 1919. 

Since Mr. Brookhart in his Des Moines speech mentioned 
reductions of wages, I shall give some facts about them. The 
average wage paid by the railways to each employe in 1921 
was $179 more than in 1919 under government control, and in 
1922 it was $136 more than in 1919. If the average wage paid 
per employe had been the same in 1921 as in 1919, the total 
operating expenses of the railways in 1921 would have been 
100 million dollars less than in 1919, and if in 1922 the same 
average wage had been paid as in 1919, the operating expenses 
would have been 362 million dollars less than they were in 1919. 

The railways will make herculean efforts to pass safely 
through the crisis in transportation which they and the public 
will have to meet this year. I do not doubt, but am entirely 
confident, that in their efforts to handle the very greatest 
practicable business with their inadequate facilities, they will 
receive the unstinted co-operation and support of the shipping 
public. 

On the other hand, when we consider the other crisis in 
our transportation affairs which we are facing, it is less easy 
to be optimistic. When the next Congress meets there will 
be a great struggle over the question of railroad regulation. In 
that struggle may be involved the entire future ownership and 
management of the railroads of this country. Business men are 
at present almost unanimously opposed to government owner- 
ship and in favor of a policy of regulation which will make it 
possible for the railways under private management to prosper 
reasonably and render adequate service. Organized labor, 
on the other hand, is in favor of government ownership and is 
actively engaged in propoganda to discredit private manage- 
ment and promote a policy of regulation such as that advocated 
by Senator Brookhart, the adoption of which would make 
successful management and development of the railways under 
private ownership impossible. 

The balance of power in this great struggle lies with the 
farmers of the country, and especially with the farmers of the 


14 


west. The farmers have suffered greatly within recent years 
from low prices and other causes. They have been told over 
and over again by radical leaders that their troubles are mostly 
due to high freight rates. They have been told that as a result 
of “government guarantees”’ the railways have been prospering, 
while they have been suffering heavy losses. The facts prove 
that these statements are not true. The average rate of the 
western railways is today only 39 per cent higher than it was 
10 years ago. Freight rates are very little higher compared 
with the prices of most farm products than they ‘were before 
the war. They are much lower relatively than the prices paid 
for some farm products. The railways have not been prosper- 
ing while the farmers have been suffering. On the contrary, 
the railways of the country, including the western lines, have 
earned a smaller net return within the last two years than at 
any time since the depression following the panic of 1893. 
The farmers of the west have suffered recently, and there is 
danger that they will suffer in the immediate future, much more 
from inability to get sufficient transportation than from freight 
rates. Reductions in rates, until they can be accompanied 
by reductions of operating expenses, would increase the shortage 
of transportation and therefore increase the losses of the 
farmers. 

- Unfortunately, however, it is very plain that many farmers 
in western territory have allowed themselves to be wholly 
misled regarding railway matters by radical labor leaders and 
politicians who have grossly misrepresented the facts to them. 
Therefore, whether the farmers finally will give their support 
to a policy of confiscatory regulation which would bring 
disaster upon them and the country, and force the railroads 
into the hands of the government, or will support a policy of 
regulation which will enable the railways to earn a reasonable 
net return, provide adequate service and avoid government 
ownership, is at present a question which no man can answer. 

One thing, however, is very certain. Farmers are the 
largest single class of property owners in this country. The 
program of railroad legislation advocated by Senator Brook- 
hart and others is a program for wholesale confiscation of 
private property. If we ever do adopt legislation for the 
confiscation of a large amount of property, whether it be 
railroad or any other kind of property, from that day no kind 


15 


30112 061937683 


of property in this country will be safe, and the farmers and ] Si, 
all other classes of property owners will in the long run suffer 


terribly from the un-American and ruinous precedent es- 
tablished. : 


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